Cooperative game for carbon obligation allocation among distribution system operators to incentivize the proliferation of renewable energy
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论文类型:期刊论文
第一作者:Quan Zhou
通讯作者:Mohammad Shahidehpour
合写作者:Tao Sun,Donghan Feng,Mingyu Yan
发表刊物:IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
收录刊物:SCI
刊物所在地:美国
学科门类:工学
一级学科:电气工程
文献类型:J
卷号:10
期号:6
页面范围:6355-6365
ISSN号:1949-3053
关键字:Carbon obligation allocation, renewable energy, cooperative game theory, distribution system operator.
DOI码:10.1109/TSG.2019.2903686
发表时间:2019-11-01
影响因子:10.275
摘要:The inclusion of electricity consumption in carbon abatement policies can further exploit the carbon reduction potentials in power system operations. In this paper, we propose a strategy for the allocation of carbon obligation as penalties among distribution system operators (DSOs) to incentivize the proliferation of renewable energy. The proposed strategy considers the fairness of the carbon obligation allocation and ensures that DSOs located closer to carbon emitting units would be allocated higher carbon obligations. The interactions among DSOs using the cooperative game theory and the impact of power network topology are comprehensively analyzed in order to properly measure each DSO’s contribution to the system carbon obligation. The allocated carbon obligations as cost penalties would incentivize DSOs to accommodate additional renewable generation to reduce the DSO’s operation cost. Thus, the proposed allocation strategy provides a technical ground for reducing carbon emissions by dispatching the additional renewable generation and reducing high carbon emission generation. In this paper, Shapley value, Aumann–Shapley rule, and prenucleolus strategies are utilized as three alternatives to allocate carbon obligations among DSOs. Two additional strategies, which are based on existing bus carbon intensity assessments, are also revisited and compared. Relevant allocation problem constraints are presented for evaluating the merits of the proposed strategies. Two case studies are analyzed to highlight the performance of the proposed Shapley value-based strategy in terms of fairness and compatibility for accommodating the additional renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions in power systems.
发布期刊链接:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8662588