Optimal transactive energy trading of electric vehicle charging stations with on-site PV generation in constrained power distribution networks
Release time:2022-03-01
Hits:
- Indexed by:
- Journal paper
- Document Code:
- 21605345
- First Author:
- Larissa Affolabi
- Correspondence Author:
- Mohammad Shahidehpour
- Co-author:
- Wei Gan,Mingyu Yan,Bo Chen,Shikhar Pandey,Aleksandar Vukojevic,Esa Aleksi Paaso,Ahmed Alabdulwahab,Abdullah Abusorrah
- Journal:
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Included Journals:
- SCI
- Place of Publication:
- United States
- Discipline:
- Engineering
- First-Level Discipline:
- Electrical Engineering
- Document Type:
- J
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 2
- Page Number:
- 1427 - 1440
- ISSN No.:
- 1949-3053
- Key Words:
- EV charging stations, two-level transactive energy, asymmetric Nash bargaining.
- DOI number:
- 10.1109/TSG.2021.3131959
- Date of Publication:
- 2022-03-01
- Impact Factor:
- 10.275
- Abstract:
- This paper presents a two-level transactive energy market framework, that enables energy trading among electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs). At the lower level, the discharging capability of EVs and on-site PV generation are leveraged by individual EVCS for participating in the transactive trading with their peers. Once the lower-level trading is completed, EVCSs trade energy at the upper level through the power grid network managed by the distribution system operator (DSO). The upper-level market is cleared while satisfying the power distribution network constraints. A cooperative game-based model is proposed to model the energy trading among EVCSs. To this end, the asymmetric Nash bargaining method is applied to allocate the grand coalition’s payoff to each EVCS at the upper-level market, while a weighted proportional allocation method is used to allocate individual EVCS’s payoff to its respective EVs at the lower-level market. The upper-level market formulation is further decomposed into two subproblems representing an energy scheduling and trading subproblem which maximizes EVCS payoffs, and a bargaining subproblem which allocates EVCS payoffs. The effectiveness of the proposed framework for incentivizing transactive trades among EVs and EVCSs is validated in case studies.
- Links to published journals:
- https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9631945